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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LELAND E. MATERN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs 
RONALD D. PHILLIPS, by his 
guardian ad litem, 
HEBER PHILLIPS, 
D,efendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8935 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STA:TEMENT OF THE CASE 
'This cause of action arose as the result of a 
traffic accident. 'The case was tried to a jury in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson, presiding. Your appellant pre-
vailed in the Court below but brings his cause to 
this Court seeking an additur to the jury verdict 
or, 'in the alternative, tha:t this Court gran't a new 
trial. Appellant relies upon 'the holding of this Court 
in the recent case of Bodon v. Suhrmann, 327 P. 2d 
826. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 7:50 a.m. on Octdber 25, 1957, appellant's 
pickup truck was stopped for a traffic light at the 
intersection of Third East and Fifth South in Salt 
Lake City. Respondent's automobile collided with 
the rear of appellant's truck. 
Apperlant, then 28 years of age, was an iron 
worker and steel mechanic (Tr. 20); and, at the 
time of the accident, was constructing a home for 
himself in Union, Utah, at about 18th East and 
7'3rd South Streets, doing all the work himself (Tr. 
21). Appellant claimed a "whiplash" injury to his 
neck with resultant stiffness in the neck. Immedi-
ately following the accident appellant did not think 
that he had suffered injury (Tr. 25). Later in the 
morning his "neck began to hurting'' and he decided 
not to work on his house that day but went home 
and 1·ested ( Tr. 25). His neck continued to be stiff 
for "about two or three days." (Tr. 26). Some two 
weeks or so later the stiffness returned and appel-
lant contracted a case of Asian flu (Tr. 26). The 
stiffness remained until "about the middle part of 
December" when appellant's flu went away and he 
go't rid of his cold (Tr. 26). However, about the 
1st of December he started getting headaches which 
became progressively worse and finally, on January 
20th, appellant went to a doctor (Tr. 27). Appellant 
had worked at his regular job during this interval 
(Tr. 27). 
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The physician recommended hospitalization in 
order that appellant's neck could be placed in trac-
tion, and appellant entered the hospital on January 
25 Where he remained for nine days (Tr. 28, 29). 
After leaving the hospital, appellant applied trac-
tion to h'is neck at home and made use of a cervical 
brace. On April 1 appellant's doctor advised that 
he start divorcing his brace and that he return to 
part time work (Tr. 34). Appellant worked on his 
house during the months of April and May (Tr. 
34-36) and returned to his full time emp11oyment 
on June 2, 1958. Appellant showed special damages 
in 'the sum of $315.28 and damage to his truck in 
the amount of $39.31. Appellant claimed loss of 
wages amounting to $1,691.69 ('Tr. 39). 
The jury verdict was for: 
General Damages --------------------------------$650.00 
Special Damages ---------------------------------- 315.28 
Damage to Truck -------------------------------- 39.31 
Total Damages ------------------------$1,004.59 
Of this your appellant complains. 
STATEMEN'T OF POINTS 
POIN'T I. 
THE 'TRIAL COURT'S IN8TRUGTION NO. 8 COR-
RECTLY 8T~TES 'THE LAW AND 'THE 'COURT'S RE-
FUSAL TO GIVE APPELLAN'T'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 1 WAS NOT ERROR. 
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POIN'T II. 
THE VERDICT WAS WELL WITHIN THE LIMITS· 
OF A RI~ASONABLE APPRAISAL OF THE DAl\riAGES 
AS SHOWN BY THE EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 8 COR-
RECTLY STATES THE LAW AND THE COURT'S RE-
FUSAL TO GIVE APPELLl\N'T'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 1 WAS NOT ERROR. 
Your appellant had been involved in a similar 
accident when his car \Vas run upon from the rear 
about one year prior to the accident which gave 
cause to the case at bar. Appellant's counsel directly 
examined his client concerning that accident to show 
that the injuries there sustained were dissimilar to 
those suffered by appellant as a result of the acci-
dent of October 25, 1957 .. A ..ppellan't testified that 
in the prior accident he suffered internal injuries 
and that he had no injury to his neck nor did he 
suffer headaches ( Tr. 39). On cross examination, 
appellant denied that he suffered any bruises in the 
first accident (Tr. 44). To rebut this testimony 
respondent resorted to the con1pla'int in that action 
which alleged: 
As a result of defendant's \\Tongful con-
duct plaintiff received nun1erous bruises, in-
ternal injuries and was otherwise injured. 
(Tr. 45). 
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The Court permitted the use of this evidence 
for purposes of impeachment only. (Enlargement 
of Record of A ppea1, 4) . 
Appellant thereafter requested the following 
'instruction be given : 
The defendant in this case is claiming 
that plaintiff's injuries, if any, were caused 
by the prior accident of November of 1956. 
In this connection you are instru~ted that the 
mere fact that plaintiff was involved in said 
prior acciden't, standing alone, is not suffi-
cient evidence to show that plaintiff's in-
juries, if any, complained of in this action 
were caused or contributed to by said prior 
accident. 
You are instructed that there is no evi-
dence that plain'tiff's injuries, if any, were 
caused or contributed to by said prior accident 
and you are further instructed that you are 
to ignore the prior accident in determining 
the cause of plaintiff's injuries, if any, and 
in assessing plain tiff's damages, if any. 
(Appellant's Brief, 8). 
;The Court refused to give the instruction and 
appellant claims prejudicia:l error, stating: 
It is generally held that evide:nce of a 
driver's previous accidents is inadmissible in 
a civil action arising out of a motor vehicle 
accident, since such evidence is immaterial in 
the determination of the drivers' negligence 
on the occasion in question. 5A Am. Jur., 
Sec. 946 and 948, p. 836, 20 A.L.R. (2) 1210. 
(Appellant's Brief, 8). 
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Certainly the evidence used and here complained 
of did no't go to the "determination of the driver's 
negligence." 
The Court did instruct the jury: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
You are further instructed that if you 
find that the plaintiff is entitled to damages, 
then in awarding him damages you may con-
sider only his loss, if any, which a prepon-
derance of the evidence shows resulted from 
the accident on October 25, 1957. He is not 
entitled to damages for a condition or loss 
from other accidents or causes unrelated to 
the collision with the defendant's automobile. 
(R. 20). 
The Court further instructed the jury: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
You are instructed that you will award 
to the plaintiff such damages, if any, as you 
find from a preponderance of the evidence 
will fairly and justly compensate him for 
personal injury and damage, if any, which 
were proximately caused by the collision. 
In determining the amount of such dam-
ages, you are instructed that you should con-
sider all pa'in and suffering that the plaintiff 
has endured, if any, both mental and physi-
cal, ever since he sustained his injuries and 
that he will probably endure in the future. 
In determining compensation for pain 
and suffering, if any, you may take into con-
sideration its probable duration and its sev-
erity. 
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The law furnishes no way by which to 
measure what is reasonable compensation for 
mental and physical pain and suffering, but 
it is left to the sound judgment and discre-
tion of the jury trying the case to determine 
from a preponderance of the evidence what is 
reasonable compensation to compensate plain-
tiff for any physical or mental pain and suf-
fering he has endured or win probably endure 
in the future. 
You are further instructed that you may 
take into consideration loss of bodily function, 
if any, which plaintiff has suffered or which 
he will probably suffer in the future. 
In determining the amount of damages 
referred to in 'the first paragraph of this 
instruction, you are further instructed that 
plaintiff is entitled to compensation for his 
actual loss of past earnings, if any, resulting 
as a proximate result of the accident in ques-
tion. 
You may likewise compensate plaintiff 
for such reasonable sums as were necessarily 
incurred for medical expenses. 
The total amount of damages assessed 
for medical expenses may not exceed the sum 
of $315.28, and the total amount of damages 
assessed for pain and suffering, loss of bodily 
function and loss of earnings, if any, may not 
exceed the sum of $20,000.00, being the 
amount prayed for by plaintiff in his com-
plaint. However, in the event tha't you do ,not 
find that the plaintiff's injuries, loss of earn-
ings and medical expenses were the proximate 
result of the negligence of the defendant, you 
will, however, award him the sum of $39.31 
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for the damages to h'is truck, which. amount 
the Court finds is the proximate result of the 
defendant's negligence. 
(R. 17, 18). 
The jury was correctly and fully instructed as 
to the law of the case. It is not improper to impeach 
a witness and by so doing test his credibility to the 
JUry. 
It is to be recalled and it is admitted that, 
"appellant's counsel brought out the fact of the 
prior accident"; (Appellant's Brief, 5), and, too, 
that the jury verdict was for appellant, although J 
in a lesser sum than that which appellant sought. 
That was the prerogative of that jury after a proper 
weighing of the evidence. We see no error, prejudi-
cial or otherwise, in the instructions given or in 
the Court's refusal to give the requested instruction. 
Appellant offers no authority to the contrary. 
POINT II. 
THE VERDICT WAS WELL WITHIN THE LIMITS 
OF A REASONABLE APPRAISAL OF THE DAMAGES 
AS SHOWN BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Relying solely upon appellant's own testimony, 
it can only be concluded that the sum awarded was 
well within a reasonable appraisal of the damages. 
The accident occurred on October 25, 1957, and 
appellant suffered a stiff neck which developed later 
on that day ( Tr. 25) ; and which lasted two or three 
days ( Tr. 26). The stiffness departed for a period 
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of two weeks and then returned concurrently with 
a "cold" and "a Tittle case of the Asian flu." (Tr. 
26). After the flu went away and appellant divorc-
ed his cold, about December 1 headaches set in 
(Tr. 26) ; and, on January 20, Appellant first went 
to see a doctor ( Tr. 2'7) . 
Appellant had worked at his regular job all 
of this period of time (Tr. 27). 
On the 25th of January, appellant was hospi-
talized ('Tr. 28), for nine days (Tr. 29). The head-
aches persisted through February and March; how-
ever, "progressively getting better." ( Tr. 32-33). 
On April 1 the doctor advised appellant to start 
"divorcing" his brace and to "'become a little active." 
(Tr. 34). During April and May appellant worked 
on his house (Tr. 34-36). Appellant laid brick in 
April ( Tr. 35) ; and, although there was some dis-
pute in the evidence as to how long appellant worked 
each day and how much of the work on the house 
had been completed before the accident, [the county 
building inspector testified that work had not been · 
started on October 12, 1957 (Tr. 123)], it is un-
disputed that the building of the house progressed. 
Respondent's Exhibits D.4 through D.9 speak for 
themselves. As the result of the collision there was 
but slight damage to the truck; there was, and ap-
pellant freely admitted doing it, considerable heavy 
construction work done on appellant's home. We 
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can only conclude that the jurors either considered 
appellant to have been a malingerer or felt that ap-
pellant was not entitled to full wages for time lost 
while making use of such time building a house for 
himself. 
Nevertheless, and in spite of all of the above, 
your appellant here says that the "uncontradicted 
evidence" places his cause squarely within the rule 
announced in Bodon v. Suhrmann, supra. We would 
contend that the application of any of the rules 
enunciated in that case must of necessity he applied 
as law to a particular fact situation; it is not suffi-
cient to say only, as does appellant, that: 
* * * when the verdict is outside the 
limi'ts of any reasonable appraisal of dam-
ages as shown by the evidence, it should not 
be permitted to stand, and if the trial court 
fails to rectify it~ \;\-e ~E·e cbJiged to n1ake the 
correction on appeal. 
We n1ust also as1 ~ the pivotal question here: 
* * * Under the rules, is the a ward of 
$1004.59 so small, in comparison to the dam-
ages which would necessarily be found from 
any reasonable appraisal of the evidence, that 
this court should grant the plaintiff some 
affirmative relief with respect to it? 
Surveying the evidence 'in the light most favor-
able to the jury's findings, that question, in this 
case, can only be answered in the negative. 
10 
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CONCLUSION 
The verdict of the jury shou1d not be disturbed. 
Respectfully subm'itted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN and ALLEN 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorneys for Respondent 
11 
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